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‡ Abstract 
 
We investigate the relative merits of unconditional cash transfers (UCT), conditional cash transfers 
(CCT), and improvements in education quality on efficiency and welfare. In our setting some parents 
under-invest in their children's education because capital market imperfections prevent them from 
borrowing. When credit constrained households can be perfectly targeted by the government, we show 
that CCT are more effective than UCT in enhancing efficiency and equivalent in terms of welfare. When 
public education quality is very low, raising quality is welfare improving, but is never efficiency 
enhancing. If the government cannot target constrained households, UCT may be the best policy both in 
terms of efficiency and welfare. 
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Nous étudions les avantages relatifs des transferts monétaires inconditionnels (UCT), des transferts 
monétaires conditionnels (CCT) et de l’amélioration de la qualité de l'éducation sur l'efficacité et le bien-
être. Dans notre modèle, certains parents sous-investissent dans l'éducation de leurs enfants parce que 
des imperfections du marché de crédit les empêchent d'emprunter. Lorsque les ménages confrontés à des 
restrictions du crédit peuvent être parfaitement ciblés par le gouvernement, nous montrons que les CCT 
ont un impact plus important en termes d’efficacité que les UCT et sont équivalents en termes de bien-
être. Lorsque la qualité de l'éducation est très faible, l'amélioration de la qualité augmente le bien-être 
mais ne peut pas améliorer l'efficacité. Si le gouvernement ne peut pas cibler les ménages contraints 
monétairement, les UCT peuvent être la meilleure politique à la fois en termes d'efficacité et de bien-être. 
 
Mots clés: transferts monétaires conditionnels, éducation publique, qualité de l’éducation, 
transferts monétaires inconditionnels, restrictions du crédit, efficacité, bien-être. 
 
Classification JEL: H31, H42, H52. 1 Introduction
Conditional cash transfers (CCT) have been extensively implemented in developing countries
since the 1990s. These programs provide low-income households with incentives to send their
children to school by tying a cash transfer to school attendance.1 The Mexican Oportunidades
and the Brazilian Bolsa Familia constitute well-known examples of CCT programs.
To justify the implementation of CCT programs, the literature has focused on the exis-
tence of social externalities (de Janvry and Sadoulet (2004)), individual irrationality, impa-
tience, or lack of self-control (Das et al. (2005)).2 Under these circumstances, it is well-known
that conditional transfers have a larger impact on individual behavior, but are never superior
in terms of utility to unconditional transfers. In contrast, little is known about the e⁄ect
of CCT when poverty, combined with the inability to borrow, is the underlying reason for
under-investing in education, as noted in Das et al. (2005) and Martinelli and Parker (2003).
The large empirical literature evaluating CCT con￿rms that these programs boost school
enrollment and decrease drop-out rates.3 However, an often-raised concern regarding CCT
is that the increase in school enrollment may not be the most e⁄ective way to raise human
capital. Indeed, the impact of CCT in terms of learning is not obvious, since education quality
is typically low in countries adopting CCT (e.g. Lockheed and Verspoor (1991), Hanushek
(1995), Glewwe (1999), Reimers et al. (2006)). Thus, a natural question is whether increasing
quality would in fact have a larger impact on human capital, as suggested by Bourguignon
et al. (2003) and Martinelli and Parker (2003), and, more generally, on lifetime income
(e¢ ciency) and utility (welfare).4
In this paper, we consider a two-period model based on Baland and Robinson (2000)
where parents under-invest in education because they are credit constrained. In addition,
we explicitly account for the role of education quality on human capital formation. In our
setting, the government provides education free of charge for constrained households, but
this is not su¢ cient to induce the e¢ cient amount of time at school. This allows us to
1In this paper, we focus exclusively on the education component of these programs. Most CCT programs
also condition on regular check-ups and some also include a nutrition counterpart. For a review of CCT
programs, see Das et al. (2005) and Rawlings and Rubio (2005).
2Another rationale for CCT is intra-household bargaining, as discussed in Martinelli and Parker (2003).
3Examples of empirical papers focusing on the education component of CCT programs include Attanasio
et al. (2005), Behrman et al. (2005), Coady and Parker (2004), de Brauw and Hoddinott (2010), Dubois
et al. (2008), Ferreira et al. (2009), Maluccio and Flores (2005), Schady and Araujo (2006), Schultz (2004),
Skou￿as and Parker (2001), Souza and Cardoso (2009), and Todd and Wolpin (2006).
4Education quality can be raised by increasing school inputs, such as school facilities or teacher quali￿ca-
tion. For a comprehensive discussion on education quality, see Hanushek (2006) and Hanushek and Rivkin
(2006).
1explore the relative merits of cash transfers (conditional and unconditional) and investments
in education quality in terms of e¢ ciency and welfare in the presence of credit constraints.
More speci￿cally, we consider the e⁄ect of marginal changes in each of the policy parameters
separately when the three policies are in place. Hence, our approach is positive and aims at
exploring the relative merits of several commonly used policy instruments.
In our model there are two inputs, time spent at school and education quality, which can
be substitutes or complements in the human capital production function.5 Parents choose
the fraction of time their children spend at school during childhood by considering the impact
of that decision on household utility.6 Since CCT are usually paid on a monthly basis over
several years, we model time spent at school as a continuous variable. Each unit of time the
child spends at school generates costs in the ￿rst period related to tuition fees, foregone child
labor earnings, and other indirect costs such as clothing, materials, and transportation. In
return, it increases household income in the second period. We assume that some households
do not have the means to defray the costs in the ￿rst period. Since credit market imperfections
prevent them from borrowing, their children spend an ine¢ ciently low amount of time at
school for any given level of education quality.
Unconditional cash transfers (UCT) are a natural instrument to recover e¢ ciency when
poverty is the reason why households under-invest in education. By increasing household
income in the ￿rst period, UCT lead credit constrained households to increase the time their
children spend at school. However, it is unclear whether UCT are more or less e⁄ective than
CCT in enhancing e¢ ciency. Indeed, in the presence of market imperfections, distorting
individual behavior by imposing conditions may be more desirable (Lipsey and Lancaster
(1956)). We contribute to this debate by investigating, ￿rst, the relative e⁄ect in terms
of e¢ ciency of UCT and CCT. Second, we explore the conditions under which policies that
improve education quality prove more adequate to recover e¢ ciency. Finally, we also evaluate
the di⁄erent policies from a welfare viewpoint.
We obtain the following results. When constrained households can be perfectly targeted,
CCT are more e¢ ciency enhancing than UCT, as in the previous literature. In contrast, in
our framework, both cash transfers are equivalent in terms of welfare. This happens for two
5Whether time spent at school and education are complements or substitutes is ultimately an empirical
question. To our knowledge little research has been done on this topic. An exception, in a slightly di⁄erent
framework, is Aker and Ksoll (2011).
6By focusing on household utility, we allow for inter-generational transfers without explicitly accounting
for these decisions. When inter-generational transfers are interior, considering household utility (as here) or
the utility of the parent and the child separately (as in Baland and Robinson (2000)) yields identical results.
2reasons. First, if households were not credit constrained, their choices would be optimal.7
Second, CCT change the unit price of education over the lifetime and allow households to
adjust their behavior at the margin. These results change when constrained households
cannot be targeted. In particular, given that children in constrained households spend less
time at school than those in unconstrained households, the former receive less income under
CCT than UCT. This undermines the positive e⁄ects of CCT on e¢ ciency and makes UCT
superior to CCT in terms of welfare for constrained households.
We also show that raising education quality increases welfare when education quality
is ine¢ ciently low. Surprisingly, when quality is very low, improving education quality is
never e¢ ciency enhancing. Since the marginal productivity of education quality is very large
when quality is very low, households can signi￿cantly decrease the time their children spend
at school and still attain the same level of income in the second period when education
quality increases. When education quality approaches its optimal level, improving quality
becomes e¢ ciency enhancing under rather general conditions. Households then respond by
increasing or decreasing the time their children spend at school, depending on the human
capital technology. However, increasing quality not only a⁄ects households decisions, but
also changes the amount of time spent at school required to maximize lifetime income (i.e.,
the e¢ cient level of education). If education quality and time spent at school are substitutes
or weak complements, we show that the e¢ cient and actual amount of time spent at school
come closer, reducing the ine¢ ciency of credit constrained households decisions.
Finally, the e⁄ect of improving quality on e¢ ciency and welfare of constrained households
does not change when unconstrained households also bene￿t from free tuition. However, free
tuition induces over-investment in education by unconstrained households, and increasing
education quality does not improve the e¢ ciency of this decision.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the
alternative policies, identi￿es the ￿rst best, and the credit constrained solution. Our main
results are based on the case where the government is able to target constrained households.
Sections 3 and 4 respectively evaluate the e⁄ects of revenue neutral changes in the policies
in terms of e¢ ciency and welfare. In Section 5, we reconsider the policies in a setting where
the government is not able to target constrained households. Section 6 concludes.
7This is a consequence of the absence of externalities and the fact that households are not irrational or
impatient.
32 The Model
A household is composed of one parent and one child and lives for two periods. The parent is
endowed with a units of e¢ cient labor (or units of human capital) and the child is endowed
with 1 unit of e¢ cient labor. The wage per unit of e¢ cient labor is w, determined exogenously
in competitive markets.
In the ￿rst period, the parent works, supplying inelastically her e¢ cient labor. She decides
on the allocation of her child￿ s time between school, e, and work 1 ￿ e, and on the amount
of savings s. These are the only economic decisions, made by the parent in the ￿rst period,
and they determine household consumption of the numeraire good in the ￿rst and second
periods.
We assume the existence of a public school that transforms q units of the numeraire
into one unit of education of quality q (Besley and Coate (1991)). We ￿rst consider the
benchmark case where the government sells this education at market prices. In this case,
the cost of acquiring e units of education is the sum of tuition costs qe; earnings forgone by
children we, and other indirect costs of education such as transportation, books or clothing
￿e: Households consume c1 and save s.
In the second period, the child (now an adult) works supplying h(e;q) e¢ ciency units
of labor. The function h is twice continuously di⁄erentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly
concave in its two arguments. We assume that limq!0 hq(e;q) = 1, where the subscript
denotes the variable with respect to which the function is di⁄erentiated. This assumption is
extreme and implies that increasing quality has a large e⁄ect on human capital, making a
case for increasing quality, when quality is very low.8 We allow for e and q to be complements,
heq(e;q) > 0, or substitutes, heq(e;q) < 0.9 Consumption in the second period, c2, is the sum
of the parent￿ s savings and the child￿ s labor income, wh(e;q):
Finally, capital markets are imperfect, so that parents can save but cannot borrow, i.e.,
s > 0. When the parental endowment of e¢ cient labor a is low, households are credit
constrained, and their only source of revenue in the second period is the child￿ s labor income.
When a is large, households are unconstrained. We denote ac and au the endowment of a
constrained and unconstrained household respectively. There is a mass of households of size
1 and ￿ is the proportion of households with low parental endowment.
There are three policies aimed at constrained households: an unconditional cash transfer
(UCT) ￿, a conditional cash transfer (CCT) ￿e, and a per unit of education tuition sub-
8Yet, as it will be made clear in Section 3, when quality tends to zero, increasing quality reduces e¢ ciency.
9This corresponds to the concept of q-complements and q-substitutes de￿ned by Hicks (1970).
4sidy fe.10 In Sections 3 and 4, we restrict the analysis to the e⁄ect of these policies on
constrained households. Finally, in Section 5 we discuss the implications of making these
policies universal.11
Public policies are ￿nanced by government debt in the ￿rst period.12 A tax T is paid by
all households in the second period.13 In order to simplify notation, we assume that agents
receive zero interest rate for their savings and that they do not discount future utility. The
government budget constraint is given by:
T = ￿(￿ + ￿ec + qec); (1)
where ec is the time spent at school by credit constrained households.
We assume that all policies are in place and we evaluate the e⁄ect of raising UCT,
CCT, and education quality that is provided free of charge to families. We assume that the
government will only increase q if the marginal bene￿t is larger than the marginal cost and
we restrict our analysis to this case. Our view is that this is also a reasonable assumption in
countries characterized by low education quality, as those having adopted conditional cash
transfers (e.g. Bourguignon et al. (2003) and Martinelli and Parker (2003)).
Assumption 1 The bene￿t of increasing education quality is larger than its tax cost for any
given choice of time spent at school.
When free tuition is targeted to constrained individuals, this assumption can be written
as whq (ec;q)￿￿ec > 0. By the assumptions on the human capital technology, this di⁄erence
is larger (smaller) the smaller (larger) is q. When whq (ec;q)￿￿ec = 0, q is optimal from the
point of view of the government, since it maximizes the di⁄erence between the income and
the tax costs generated by education.
We now turn to the parents￿choice of e and s. Household utility is denoted:
Ui = U(c1i) + U(c2i); (2)
10It is convenient to distinguish the CCT from the tuition subsidy, since we will concentrate on the case of
free tuition for the constrained households, i.e. f = q.
11Gahvari and Mattos (2007) deal with the optimal design of CCT in the presence of information asym-
metries.
12This is the most favorable scenario since a tax in the ￿rst period would tighten even more the budget
of constrained households. We have, however, veri￿ed that the timing of taxes does not change our main
results. The qualitative results also remain unchanged if no taxes are levied and the funds come from external
sources.
13This redistributive aspect of the policy does not a⁄ect our qualitative results. The case in which there is
no redistribution can be easily derived by making ￿ = 1.
5where the subindex i = fc;ug denotes whether the household is constrained or unconstrained,
and:
c1i = wai + w(1 ￿ e) ￿ ￿e ￿ qe + fe + ￿ + ￿e ￿ s; (3)
c2i = s + wh(e;q) ￿ T: (4)
Parents maximize (2) with respect to e and s, subject to (3) and (4), and the constraint that
s ￿ 0. First order conditions are su¢ cient for maximization since the second order conditions
are satis￿ed. When choosing e, parents equalize the marginal cost and the marginal bene￿t
of spending time at school in terms of household utility:
(w + ￿ + q ￿ f ￿ ￿)U
0 (c1i) = whe(ei;q)U
0 (c2i) and ei > 0; (5)
assuming that there is an interior optimal solution for e when ￿ < w + ￿ + q ￿ f. Thus,
we restrict our analysis to the cases where the CCT does not cover all the costs related to
education, as supported by empirical evidence (e.g. Schultz (2004)). If they do, the optimal
choice of e is 1.
The optimal choice of s is given by:
U
0 (c2u) = U
0 (c1u) and su > 0; (6)
U
0 (c2c) < U
0 (c1c) and sc = 0: (7)
When households are unconstrained, saving allows them to equalize marginal utility in both
periods. When they are credit constrained, savings are zero and the marginal utility of ￿rst
period consumption is larger: Parents would like to borrow, but are prevented from doing so
by credit market imperfections.
2.1 First Best
The ￿rst best is the benchmark case where ￿ = ￿ = f = T = 0 and capital markets are
perfect. When the savings choice is interior we combine (5) and (6) to obtain:
whe (eu;q) = (w + ￿ + q); (8)
for a given q. Condition (8) characterizes the amount of time spent at school that maximizes
households￿lifetime income, i.e., the e¢ cient level of e. This is given by the equality between
6the marginal bene￿t, whe (e;q), and the marginal cost of time spent at school, (w + ￿ + q).
Thus, for unconstrained households, the decision concerning education investment maximizes
utility and it is e¢ cient.
2.2 Credit Constrained Solution without Government
When households are too poor and unable to borrow, their children spend an ine¢ ciently
low amount of time at school, as in Baland and Robinson (2000). Indeed, combining (5) and
(7):
whe (ec;q) > (w + ￿ + q): (9)
Since the marginal bene￿t of time spent at school is larger than its marginal cost, households
could increase lifetime income by raising e. This would require transferring income from
the second to the ￿rst period to cover education costs. However, the borrowing constraint
prevents them from doing so.
3 E¢ ciency
In this section, we explore the relative merits of alternative policies in enhancing e¢ ciency
in the education decision of credit constrained households. We de￿ne:
Ic = whe (ec;q) ￿ (w + ￿ + q) > 0; (10)
as the ine¢ ciency of the decision concerning time spent at school by constrained house-
holds.14
We assume that tuition is free for constrained households. With free tuition, the choice of
time spent at school by constrained parents is whe (ec;q) > (w + ￿). Therefore, Ic = 0 if and
only if whe (ec;q)￿(w + ￿) = q. For the sake of interest, we assume whe (ec;q)￿(w + ￿) > q,
that is, constrained households under-invest in their children￿ s education even if it is tuition
free. Otherwise, either household behavior would already be e¢ cient, or the government
could simply reduce the subsidy in order to recover e¢ ciency.
14Using (5) and (7), we obtain whe(ec;q) = (w + ￿ + q)
U
0(c1c)
U0(c2c) > (w + ￿ + q), since the household is




U0(c2c) or whe(ec;q) ￿ (w + ￿ + q), they are univocally related, and both approaches yield similar
qualitative results.
7We now analyze alternative policies ￿UCT, CCT, and improvements in education quality
￿that may enhance e¢ ciency in the parents￿decisions concerning education. We investigate
the e⁄ect of marginal changes in each of the policy parameters separately when the three
policies are in place. This allows us to consider marginal changes from one policy to the
other such that the government budget constraint is kept balanced.
3.1 Cash Transfers











￿(w + ￿ ￿ ￿)U00 (c1c) ￿ whe(ec;q)￿U00 (c2c)
(w + ￿ ￿ ￿)
2 U00 (c1c) + (whe(ec;q))
2 U00 (c2c) + whee(ec;q)U0 (c2c)
> 0: (11)
By increasing income in the ￿rst period, an increase in UCT reduces the marginal utility of
￿rst period consumption and, by (5), the marginal cost of investing in education. Conversely,
an increase in UCT reduces income in the second period through higher taxes, thereby
increasing the marginal utility in the second period and thus the marginal bene￿t of time
spent at school. As a result, an increase in UCT always increases the amount of time that
the child spends at school, reducing the ine¢ ciency of the education decision. Note that the
e⁄ect on the behavior of constrained households is intrinsically related to the relaxation of
the credit constraint: even if UCT received equal taxes paid, the ine¢ ciency is reduced.












U0 (c1c) ￿ (w + ￿ ￿ ￿)ecU00 (c1c) ￿ whe(ec;q)￿ecU00 (c2c)
(w + ￿ ￿ ￿)
2 U00 (c1c) + (whe(ec;q))
2 U00 (c2c) + whee(ec;q)U0 (c2c)
> 0: (12)
Similar to the UCT, the increase in CCT raises the marginal bene￿t and reduces the marginal
15Since s = 0, we only need to study the marginal e⁄ects on the education decision through (5).
8cost in terms of utility, leading to more time spent at school. As before, these e⁄ects alleviate
the credit constraint. Moreover, the reduction in the marginal cost is now enhanced by the
reduction in the price of education due to ￿.
Proposition 1 Conditional cash transfers are always more e⁄ective than unconditional cash
transfers in reducing the ine¢ ciency of credit constrained households￿decisions when they can
be targeted.
Proof. An increase in CCT compensated by a reduction in UCT that keeps the government
budget constraint balanced requires:
d￿ = ￿ecd￿; (13)
from (1). The total e⁄ect of this change on ine¢ ciency is given by ￿￿;￿
c = dIc




















(w + ￿ ￿ ￿)
2 U00 (c1c) + (whe(ec;q))
2 U00 (c2c) + whee(ec;q)U0 (c2c)
< 0:
CCT are clearly more distortive than UCT since they are conditioned on behavior. Still,
in line with the Theory of the Second Best (Lipsey and Lancaster (1956)), in the presence
of market imperfections, it turns out to be desirable to introduce additional distortions.
Indeed, Proposition 1 shows that CCT are more e⁄ective in reducing ine¢ ciency than UCT,
for households that are credit constrained and can be perfectly targeted.
3.2 Education Quality
Since all children attend the same school system, any policy a⁄ecting education quality nec-
essarily a⁄ects both constrained and unconstrained households. However, increasing q has
di⁄erent implications for constrained households, who do not pay tuition fees, and uncon-
strained households, who bear the full cost of education. In terms of e¢ ciency, we show in
Appendix A that unconstrained households decisions concerning time spent at school are
e¢ cient and remain e¢ cient following an increase in q, provided that they are not entitled
to free tuition.
9For credit constrained households, di⁄erentiating (9) with respect to q, we ￿nd:
dIc
dq




In contrast to UCT and CCT, an increase in quality alters the e¢ cient level of time spent at
school itself, i.e., the amount of time spent at school required to maximize lifetime income.
This can be seen in the two ￿rst terms in (15). The cross derivative heq (e;q) is the direct e⁄ect
of quality on the marginal productivity of time spent at school. It is positive (negative) when
time spent at school and education quality are complements (substitutes), implying that the
e¢ cient level of e increases (decreases) following the increase in q. Thus, for a given choice
of e, the ine¢ ciency increases (decreases) due to this ￿rst term. The second term in (15)
represents the larger cost attached to providing higher education quality. By raising the
marginal cost of e, this e⁄ect unambiguously decreases the ine¢ ciency of a given choice of e.
The e⁄ects of q on Ic through the ￿rst two terms in (15) can be summarized as follows.
If e and q are substitutes, an increase in q unambiguously reduces the e¢ cient level of e,
reducing the ine¢ ciency of the education decision for a given choice of e. Then, a higher q
allows households to maximize lifetime income with less time spent at school. Even if there is
no change in behavior, the ine¢ ciency is reduced. If e and q are complements, the e⁄ect of q
on the e¢ cient level of e is ambiguous. On the one hand, a larger q requires more time spent
at school to attain e¢ ciency. On the other hand, it increases the marginal cost of education,
and therefore reduces the di⁄erence between marginal bene￿t and marginal cost.
In addition, the complementarity or substitutability of e and q also a⁄ects the choice of
e when q increases (last term in (15)). In the case of constrained households, by (5) and the




wheq(ec;q)U0 (c2c) + (whq(ec;q) ￿ ￿ec)whe(ec;q)U00 (c2c)
(w + ￿ ￿ ￿)
2 U00 (c1c) + (whe(ec;q))
2 U00 (c2c) + whee(ec;q)U0 (c2c)
: (16)
If e and q are substitutes, an increase in q unambiguously decreases the time spent at school
chosen by constrained households. If they are complements, there are two opposite e⁄ects
on time spent at school. First, households have an incentive to increase time spent at school
since the marginal productivity of e is larger when q increases. Second, households can attain
the same income in the second period by devoting less time to school and therefore have an
incentive to decrease e. The lower is q, the larger is the second e⁄ect. Propositions 2 and 3
state the results obtained when these e⁄ects are combined.
10Proposition 2 When education quality is very low, an increase in quality never enhances
e¢ ciency for constrained households.
Proof. Plugging (16) into (15) and manipulating the resulting expression, we obtain:
wheq (ec;q) <
(whq(ec;q) ￿ ￿ec)whe(ec;q)whee (ec;q)U00 (c2c)










where D ￿ (w + ￿ ￿ ￿)
2 U00 (c1c) + (whe(ec;q))
2 U00 (c2c) < 0. By the assumptions on the
human capital production function, when quality is very low, A ! ￿1, and (17) cannot be
satis￿ed.
When education quality is very low, Proposition 2 shows that the household always de-
creases time spent at school, even if e and q are complements. Since the marginal productivity
of q is very large when q is low, the household can achieve the same income in the second
period by devoting less time to school when q increases. As explained before, the e¢ cient
level of e is also a⁄ected. When e and q are complements, increased quality raises the e¢ cient
level of e, moving it further away from the households. Since the e¢ cient level of time spent
at school increases and the actual time spent at school decreases, the ine¢ ciency unambigu-
ously increases. When e and q are substitutes, increased quality decreases the e¢ cient level
of time spent at school. If q is very low, the decrease in time spent at school by constrained
households is larger than the reduction in the e¢ cient level of e. Thus, ine¢ ciency always
increases.
More generally, when q is low enough so that A + B < 0, ine¢ ciency can be reduced
only if e and q are su¢ ciently strong substitutes: heq (e;q) < A + B. In this case, credit
constrained households still reduce the time their children spend at school, as a response to
the increase in q. However, due to the strong substitutability between e and q, the e¢ cient
amount of time falls still more and, therefore, ine¢ ciency can in principle be reduced.
Proposition 3 states the e⁄ects of increasing quality on e¢ ciency when quality approaches
its optimal level.
Proposition 3 When education quality approaches its optimal level, an increase in quality
always enhances e¢ ciency for constrained households provided that time spent at school and
education quality are substitutes, or weak complements.
Proof. When quality approaches its optimal value, whq(e;q) ￿ ￿ec ! 0, A tends to zero
and A + B > 0. Condition (17) is always satis￿ed for heq (e;q) < 0. Thus, raising q always
11reduces ine¢ ciency when e and q are substitutes. When heq (e;q) > 0, ine¢ ciency will be
reduced only if heq (e;q) < A + B, i.e., if time spent at school and quality are su¢ ciently
weak complements.
When quality is close to its optimal level, the e⁄ect on second period net income tends to
zero, so households have less incentives to reduce e (second term in (16)). As a result, when
e and q are substitutes, the reduction in time spent at school is less intense than when q is
low. In contrast, when e and q are complements, the increase in e is larger than when q is
low. As already mentioned, the e¢ cient level of e decreases when e and q are substitutes or
weak complements. In both cases, the actual and the e¢ cient level of e come closer to each
other following an increase in q.
Therefore, increasing quality is never e¢ ciency enhancing when quality is very low. Note
that this is in spite of the fact that we assumed that increasing quality has a large e⁄ect on
human capital when quality is very low. Indeed, in this case, households react by decreas-
ing signi￿cantly the time their children spend at school and this increases ine¢ ciency. We
can conclude that CCT are best in terms of e¢ ciency when quality is low and constrained
households can be targeted.
4 Welfare
When focusing on welfare, we are concerned about the e⁄ect of these policies in terms of
household utility as opposed to lifetime income. Clearly, an increase in net income improves
welfare whether it is provided in the ￿rst or second period. When a policy implies a transfer
of income between the two periods, its ￿nal e⁄ect depends crucially on the credit constraint.
In this section, we focus on the e⁄ect of cash transfers and education quality on constrained
household utility.
4.1 Cash Transfers
Using (1)-(4) with q = f and s = 0 and applying the envelope theorem, we obtain that an




0 (c1c) ￿ ￿U
0 (c2c) > 0: (18)
This happens for two reasons. First, the UCT represents a net positive transfer to constrained
households, since ￿ < 1. Second, by transferring income from the second to the ￿rst period,
12where marginal utility is higher, the UCT relaxes the credit constraint. Thus, even if ￿ = 1,
implying that households pay in the second period the same amount they receive in the ￿rst
period, an increase in UCT always increases welfare of constrained households by relaxing
the credit constraint.
An increase in CCT also raises welfare of credit constrained households, but this e⁄ect is




0 (c1c) ￿ ￿U
0 (c2c)) > 0; (19)
by the envelope theorem. As will be shown in Section 5, this unambiguously positive e⁄ect of
CCT on constrained households￿welfare relies on the fact that only constrained households
receive the CCT. Proposition 4 summarizes the comparison of UCT and CCT for constrained
households.
Proposition 4 In the presence of credit constraints, conditional and unconditional cash
transfers have the same positive e⁄ect on household welfare if credit constrained households
can be targeted.
Proof. From (18) and (19), an increase in CCT coupled with a decrease in UCT that leaves













Since we consider changes in policy that leave the government budget constraint balanced,
both UCT and CCT have the same e⁄ect in terms of income, i.e., the credit constraint is
relaxed to the same extent in both cases. We have seen in Section 3 that UCT and CCT
have di⁄erent impacts on the choice of time spent at school. However, because households
equalize marginal costs and bene￿ts when choosing e, the ￿nal e⁄ect of the change from UCT
to CCT on welfare is nil.
This conclusion can appear surprising in view of the results obtained previously in the
literature, which suggest that UCT are always more welfare enhancing than CCT. On reason
for our result is that, in our framework, households would take optimal decisions in the ab-
sence of credit constraints. Moreover, in our model, CCT change the unit price of education,
while allowing households to choose the level of e that equalizes marginal bene￿t and the
13marginal cost of time spent at school.16
4.2 Education Quality
We have discussed in Section 3 that increasing quality never reduces the ine¢ ciency of con-
strained households￿decisions when quality is very low, but always preserves the e¢ ciency
of unconstrained household decisions. In contrast, the e⁄ect on constrained household￿ s wel-
fare is unambiguously positive when quality is ine¢ ciently low and tends to zero as quality
approaches its optimal value.
Proposition 5 When education quality is low, increasing quality improves constrained house-
hold welfare. As education quality approaches its optimal level, the e⁄ect of increasing quality
on welfare tends to zero.
Proof. Using (1)-(4) with q = f and s = 0 and applying the envelope theorem, we obtain:
dUc
dq
= (whq (ec;q) ￿ ￿ec)U
0 (c2c) > 0; (20)
under Assumption 1. If whq (ec;q) ￿ ￿ec ! 0; dUc
dq ! 0.
The welfare e⁄ect for unconstrained households, who are also a⁄ected by the increase in
q, is ambiguous, as shown in Appendix A. This is so because increasing education quality
raises the cost of tuition in the ￿rst period, but increases net income in the second period. If
it is positive, it is always smaller than the e⁄ect on constrained households welfare. Unlike
the constrained, unconstrained households pay tuition costs and taxes, and they also have a
lower marginal utility of second period consumption due to larger income.
Concerning constrained households, the welfare e⁄ect of increasing education quality and
simultaneously reducing CCT in order to leave the budget balanced (i.e., dq = ￿d￿) is trivial,
given by (19) and (20). Increasing quality is more (less) welfare enhancing than CCT or UCT,
when quality is low (high) relatively to the severity of the household credit constraint.
16Alternatively, CCT can be seen as a lump-sum transfer conditional on having achieved a pre-established
threshold of time spent at school. In that case, the transfer may push household choice to a corner where
satisfying the requirement and receiving the transfer is better than not, but households would be better
o⁄ if the transfer was not conditional on the amount of time spent at school. In our view, when studying
households￿choice over the lifetime, the number of periods over which the transfer is received is large and
the ￿rst, continuous, approach is more appropriate.
145 Universal Policies
In the analysis, we assumed that the government is able to target UCT, CCT, and free
education exclusively at constrained households. When targeting cannot be achieved, some
of our previous results need to be quali￿ed. More importantly, the e⁄ect of the di⁄erent
policies on unconstrained household e¢ ciency and welfare need to be taken into account. In
this case, the government budget constraint becomes:
T = ￿ + ￿￿ e + q￿ e; (21)
where ￿ e = ￿ec + (1 ￿ ￿)eu is the average level of time spent at school.
5.1 E¢ ciency
The e⁄ect of the di⁄erent policies on the e¢ ciency of constrained households behavior remains
qualitatively the same as in Section 3. However, it is now unclear whether UCT or CCT is
the best policy in terms of e¢ ciency. On the one hand, CCT has a larger e⁄ect on behavior
through the price e⁄ect. On the other hand, constrained households receive less with CCT
than with UCT, since their children spend less time at school than the average. Using (21)




hee (ec;q)U0 (c1c)d￿ + hee (ec;q)(w + ￿ ￿ ￿)U00 (c1c)(￿ e ￿ ec)d￿
(w + ￿ ￿ ￿)
2 U00 (c1c) + (whe(ec;q))
2 U00 (c2c) + whee(ec;q)U0 (c2c)
:
With respect to unconstrained households, we know that in the absence of policies, their
decisions are e¢ cient and given by (8). Since their savings are interior, we need to consider
the e⁄ect of policies on the simultaneous choice of e and s. Using Cramer Rule, it is easy
to show that an increase in UCT has no e⁄ect on the time spent at school by children of
unconstrained households. As a result, an UCT has no impact on e¢ ciency. In contrast, an




￿U0 (c1u)(U00 (c1u) + U00 (c2u)) + U00 (c1u)U00 (c2u)(eu ￿ ￿ e)(w + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ whe)
(U00 (c1u) + U00 (c2u))wU0 (c2u)hee (eu;q) + U00 (c1u)U00 (c2u)(w + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ whe (eu;q))
2:







Thus, unconstrained households increase the time their children spend at school following and
15increase in CCT. This leads to an ine¢ cient behavior since the left-hand side of expression (8)
decreases while the right-hand side remains unchanged. As a result of CCT, unconstrained
households over-invest in education with respect to the e¢ cient level.
Similarly, if unconstrained households bene￿t from free tuition, they over-invest in ed-
ucation. When education quality increases, they adjust their behavior. We can show that
the ine¢ ciency of the time spent at school by children of unconstrained households increases
since they do not face the true costs of the quality increase when they receive free tuition.17
Summarizing, when constrained households cannot be perfectly targeted, it is no longer
true that CCT is unambiguously superior to UCT in terms of e¢ ciency. Since constrained
households spend less time at school than unconstrained households, they receive less income
under CCT than UCT. This undermines the positive e⁄ects of CCT on e¢ ciency and makes
UCT superior to CCT in terms of welfare for constrained households. For unconstrained
households, UCT is neutral in terms of e¢ ciency and CCT enhances the ine¢ ciency. Also, if
unconstrained households bene￿t from free tuition, they over-invest in education. Increasing
education quality in this case only aggravates the ine¢ ciency of this decision.
5.2 Welfare
As before, accounting for unconstrained households in the government budget constraint
changes some of the welfare results we obtained when constrained households could be per-





0 (c1c) ￿ U




0 (c2c)(whq (ec;q) ￿ ￿ e) > 0:
However, allowing for heterogeneity in the recipients of CCT implies that those who spend
less time at school end up receiving less than they pay in taxes. As a result, the e⁄ect on





0 (c1u)ec ￿ U
0 (c2u) ￿ e:
17The proof is similar to the one in Appendix A, but accounts for the fact that unconstrained households
also receive free education.





0 (c1u) ￿ U
0 (c2u) = 0:
dUu
d￿
= (eu ￿ ￿ e)U




0 (c2u)(whq (eu;q) ￿ ￿ e) > 0:
The e⁄ect of UCT on the welfare of unconstrained individuals is zero, since they receive in
the ￿rst period the same amount they pay in the second period and they are not constrained,
i.e., U0 (c1) = U0 (c2). An increase in CCT has a positive impact on unconstrained house-
hold￿ s welfare because their children spend more time at school than children of constrained
households. Finally, the e⁄ect of raising quality on unconstrained households welfare is posi-
tive, but smaller than the e⁄ect on constrained households due to a lower marginal utility of
consumption in the second period. Thus, increasing quality has an unambiguously positive
e⁄ect on the welfare of all households, larger for the constrained than for the unconstrained
households.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the impact on e¢ ciency and welfare of three alternative policies
￿ UCT, CCT and improvements in education quality ￿ aimed at households that spend
an ine¢ ciently low amount of time at school due to credit constraints. When constrained
households can be perfectly targeted, we show that CCT are more e¢ ciency enhancing than
UCT because they not only relax the credit constraint, but they also change the unit price
of education. In contrast, for a given budget, both cash transfers are equivalent in terms of
welfare.
Improving education quality, by investing in schools, teachers, or any education input
other than time spent at school, also increases welfare when education quality is ine¢ ciently
low, as in poor developing countries. However, the e⁄ects of improving education quality in
terms of e¢ ciency are less clear cut. When education quality is very low, the ine¢ ciency can
never be reduced by increasing education quality. As quality approaches its optimal level,
the impact of improving education quality on welfare becomes small. Then, raising education
17quality enhances e¢ ciency, except if time spent at school and education quality are strong
complements. We conclude that CCT are best in terms of e¢ ciency when quality is low and
constrained households can be targeted.
We also show that these results rely on the assumption of perfect targeting. Indeed,
when the government cannot perfectly distinguish constrained from unconstrained house-
holds, UCT could be the best policy in terms of e¢ ciency and welfare.
In our model, time spent at school is a continuous variable and CCT, paid by unit of
time, change the price of education. This is the most appropriate approach when considering
decisions over the lifetime, as we do in this paper. Alternatively, CCT could be conditioned
on achieving a pre-determined threshold of school participation. In this case, households
decisions could be distorted at the margin and the equivalence of CCT and UCT in terms of
welfare, when constrained households can be targeted, would no longer hold.18
We have considered a very simple structure of taxation with uniform lump-sum taxes.
This has the advantage of isolating the impact of expenditures from any distortive e⁄ect of
taxation. It would be interesting to consider alternative sources of revenue more speci￿c to
developing countries. We leave these issues for future research.
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A Education Quality: Unconstrained Decisions
In the absence of policy intervention, unconstrained households take e¢ cient decisions charac-
terized by (8). Following the increase in quality, unconstrained households react by adjusting
the time their children spend at school. Since their savings decision is interior, we need to
account for the simultaneous e⁄ect of q on e and s. Let eu be the choice of time spent at
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= 0;
by (6). Thus, following the increase in q, unconstrained households adapt the time their
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using (1)-(4) with f = 0 and applying the envelope theorem. The welfare e⁄ect of an increase
in q for unconstrained households is ambiguous when they do not bene￿t from free tuition.
21